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Ⅰ．Introduction
 The South China Sea Arbitration? award, ruled upon by the tribunal 
established under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
Abstract
 The award rendered by the Permanent Court of Arbitration ?PCA? at The Hague 
in the dispute between the Philippines and China on ?? July ???? is not as innovative or 
singular for most international lawyers as the international media reported. This is because, 
judging by precedents concerning international litigation by default of the respondent, such 
as those in the International Court of Justice ?ICJ?, the absence of China throughout the 
procedures almost guaranteed a favourable perspective from the beginning, thanks to the 
cunning litigation strategy set by the Philippines. However, what has so far been neglected 
by international lawyers is the fact that the litigation?s framework, allegedly prescribed by 
the ???? United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ?UNCLOS?, is constrained 
by the current rules of international law, including UNCLOS. Behind the scenes, there 
is more going on; the current framework of the judicial settlement mechanism within 
international law will not appropriately consider the historical viewpoint of the regional 
politics in Southeast Asia. This article aims to solve that oversight and to offer a critical 
outlook of the procedures from a juridical and historical point of view. The article concludes 
that, unfortunately, this litigation and the award will not necessarily further the goal of the 
South China Sea dispute.
Key words: South China Sea dispute, nine-dash line, law of the sea, UNCLOS, arbitration, 
Eastphalia
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?UNCLOS? on ?? July ????,? is in favour of the Republic of the Philippines 
?the Philippines?, as expected by almost all Western international lawyers. 
As far as the content, scope, and history of the current body of international 
law are concerned, this result was not surprising. From the very beginning, it 
seems that the Philippines, who unilaterally initiated the litigation against the 
People?s Republic of China ?China?, assumed that China would certainly 
reject its jurisdiction, as well as any award, just as the other permanent 
members of the United Nations Security Council have repeatedly done 
?Allison?.
 There are various reasons for the initiation of this litigation under 
UNCLOS, as pointed out previously ?Hu & McDorman; Talmon & Jia?. It 
is possible that some foreign lawyers drove the Philippines to file the case at 
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea ?ITLOS?. These lawyers 
seemingly dared to challenge the peaceful settlement mechanism prescribed in 
UNCLOS through carefully drafted applications. In these applications, they 
raised legal issues that had been adjusted to fit the requirements under Part 
XV of UNCLOS. Accordingly, it was expected that an Arbitration Tribunal 
would be successfully established through the initiative of the incumbent 
President of ITLOS under Article ? e?? of Annex VII of UNCLOS 
?Chandrasekhara & Gautier?. It was also hoped that UNCLOS would 
admit its jurisdiction of the application,? despite the fact that China had 
already by declaration attempted to remove the possibility of any compulsory 
dispute settlement mechanism in the case of designated categories of disputes, 
including territorial sovereignty ?Rao?.
 China, for its part, lacks experience in international litigation, or a field 
where skilful and experienced Western legal practitioners tend to carefully 
craft the structure of their arguments based on their judicial and arbitral 
expertise. They are aware that a litigant must be well prepared in terms of 
facts, law, strategy, and other details of litigation technique ?Legum?. In this 
sense, it can be said that China made a fatal mistake when it published its 
legal position on this litigation in ?The Position Paper of the Government of 
the People?s Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South 
China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines?, dated ? 
December ???? ? Position Paper?.? This response only succeeded in giving 
an advantageous push to the Philippines? politically motivated plan, which 
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was supported mainly by Western countries. As a legal strategy, it may be 
said that China could have neglected the arbitration entirely, as the country 
had initially decided not to take part. This blunder, though perhaps deriving 
from a sense of honesty and justice, was taken as China?s intention to express 
itself outside of the Tribunal. The Position Paper was substantially succeeded 
by China?s white paper, ?China Adheres to the Position of Settling Through 
Negotiation the Relevant Disputes Between China and the Philippines in the 
South China Sea? on the very next day of the Arbitral Award, ?? July ????.?
 By itself, the award on merits is not necessarily intriguing, except for 
the fact that, literally interpreting and applying UNCLOS, the Arbitral 
Tribunal pronounced on the following two major points regarding the 
dispute: ??? it denied the legal ground of China?s so-called ?nine-dash line? 
in the South China Sea, and ??? it found none of the geographical features 
of the South China Sea to have the legal status of an island under Article 
??? of UNCLOS. The reasoning in the award on merits could have been 
to a certain degree predictable and reasonably within the realm of arbitral 
function under international law. For those who would take this case from 
a different point of view, however, the award may seem to be irreparably 
harmful and misleading in the current world situation, where the status quo 
has been unexpectedly challenged by the unprecedented rise, or even ?return? 
?Kissinger? of China as the world?s second-largest power. In line with this 
argument, it is also maintained by some commentators that China?s major aim 
is to align the current world legal order with its own perspective, based on its 
own political, economic, and military power. This tendency and order may be 
referred to as an ?Eastphalian? world order in comparison with the modern 
basic international system called the Peace of Westphalia of ???? ?Fidler, 
???; Ginsburg, ??????. It was also noted that China may have already 
become not only a ?rule changer?, but also a ?game changer? Beckman? in 
world politics. However, China?s challenge may not yet have been successful 
under the current international legal order, although it may want to play the 
so-called new Great Game on ?the appropriate spaces of sovereignty and 
internationalism? Desierto, ???? with the United States, which certainly 
takes no position on disputes over territorial sovereignty but retains its national 
interests in the region ?US Department of State; Campbell & Salidjanova?.
 Under these circumstances, the South China Sea dispute is not a 
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regional one that affects only Southeast Asia but a global dispute with 
international impact. China has been a communist country since its 
establishment, but particularly during the period between its defeat in the 
Opium War of ????????? and the end of the Second World War, the country 
has been forced to stay outside of the central forum where international law 
is created and adopted ?Xue, ???. Its semi-colonised position and singular 
ideology as well as its long history of civilisation may lead China to feel 
uncomfortable and unsatisfied with the current situation in the South China 
Sea and the international rules applied in the current global affairs ?Tzou, ??
??; Lo?. China?s domestic maritime laws and regulations, which have been 
legislated and updated since China?s ratification of the UNCLOS, are largely 
based on UNCLOS ?Greenfield?.
 Against the historical and cultural background mentioned above, this 
article aims to take a fresh look at the arbitration procedures in the South 
China Sea Arbitration, largely using juridical and historical arguments; it 
is hoped that doing so will bridge the gap between the perception of those 
who support the Arbitral Award of ?? July ???? and those who criticise it. A 
juridical point of view normally addresses the jurisdictional phase, the merits 
phase, and other related phases of the arbitration procedures. However, owing 
to the space available to this article, the author first focuses on two aspects 
of the Award: ??? the significance of China?s nine-dash line, and ??? the 
legal status of the geographical features in the South China Sea. Second, a 
historical point of view considers hidden or overlooked historical incidents 
that are involved in the dispute. The author of the present article, whose 
intention is not to defend or support China?s position or argument, would 
like to stress those aspects not usually covered by an orthodox and traditional 
approach to international law, as the arguments concerned with ??? and ??? 
mentioned above not only fundamentally contradict China?s position but also 
cast a very dark shadow on an eventual settlement of the South China Sea 
dispute; China does not want to play the game of international law by the 
same rules, particularly in this dispute. This game also includes the jurisdiction 
of UNCLOS, which is, for China, a product of the rulers who created the 
current order through imperial colonisation. In conclusion, the present article 
wishes to propose a fresh look at the South China Sea dispute and to discuss 
several different viewpoints regarding the peaceful settlement of international 
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disputes in this region, as the role international law can play in this dispute is 
limited in effect.
Ⅱ． China’s Position on the Compulsory Settlement Procedure 
of the South China Sea Dispute
 China?s official position on the dispute and its background was not 
clarified for many years, even after conflicts among the states concerned 
started to arise frequently in the late twentieth century and despite severe 
criticism of China?s government. This low-key attitude may have been because 
of either a governmental policy or a strategy of ambiguity. 
 Strangely, however, China suddenly issued its ?Position Paper? after 
the start of litigation, as if the country wished to respond to the Philippines 
outside the Tribunal, in spite of its almost de facto forum prorogatum. Unable to 
keep quiet and indifferent to the case, perhaps China felt obliged to respond 
when faced with global pressure during the procedures. As explained below, 
this turned out be a critical failure by China in terms of international litigation. 
The ?Position Paper? of ???? succinctly and comprehensively describes 
China?s legal and historical views of the dispute, ignoring the question of the 
procedures? legal validity. Unfortunately, the Tribunal took this almost as an 
official reply to the case, which China had certainly never intended ?Position 
Paper, paragraph ??. This is only because, on this point, the Tribunal ?decided 
to treat the objections in China?s Position Paper and communications as 
effectively constituting a plea on jurisdiction? Award on Jurisdiction, paragraph 
???, emphasis added?.
 This chapter discusses China?s intentions and objectives regarding 
the litigation and considers what was not addressed or clarified during the 
procedures and the award. The arguments made here are double-faceted: they 
apply both within the procedures of this litigation and in the outside realm.
A. Outside the Litigation
 From the beginning, China firmly and assertively held the following position:
  The essence of the subject matter of the arbitration is the territorial 
sovereignty over several maritime features in the South China Sea, 
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which is beyond the scope of the Convention and does not concern 
the interpretation or application of the Convention. ?Position Paper, 
paragraphs ? & ?-???
For China, this point is the most important in this litigation. It also maintains 
that, in accordance with the ???? China-ASEAN Declaration on the 
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea? DOC? and some other relevant 
joint statements between China and the Philippines, the South China Sea 
dispute should be resolved among the states concerned through negotiation, 
without letting any third party interfere ?Position Paper, paragraphs ??????.
 However, the Tribunal rejected this position on the following grounds: 
??? the DOC is a political agreement and not legally binding, ??? it does 
not provide a mechanism for a binding settlement, ??? it does not exclude 
other means of settling disputes, and ??? the DOC does not, therefore, 
restrict the Tribunal?s jurisdiction under Articles ???? or ???? of UNCLOS. 
Even though both the Philippines and China had made other agreements and 
joint statements referring to the resolution of disputes through negotiation, 
the Tribunal found none of these to constitute a legally binding impediment 
to the Philippines? unilateral application for arbitration. The prior diplomatic 
communications between these parties regarding the resolution of the dispute 
are all construed as meeting the requirement to exchange views under Article 
???? of UNCLOS ?Award on Merits, paragraph ????. 
 One of the most controversial points of the litigation was the Arbitral 
Tribunal?s jurisdiction that was established under UNCLOS ?Award on 
Merits, paragraphs ????????. This is mainly because, in its declaration of ?? 
August ????, ?which was made after ratification on ? June ???? in accordance 
with Article ??? of UNCLOS?,?? China had already designated some dispute 
categories as excluded from the compulsory dispute settlement mechanism 
under UNCLOS. China?s declaration reads:
  The Government of the People?s Republic of China does not accept 
any of the procedures provided for in Section ? of Part XV of the 
Convention with respect to all the categories of disputes referred to in 
paragraph ? a? b? and ?c? of Article ??? of the Convention.
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Therefore, China was extraordinarily surprised when the Arbitral Tribunal 
accepted, in its award of ???? on jurisdiction and admissibility, the 
Philippines? application and established its jurisdiction.??
 In this context, it is worth noting UNCLOS?s relevant clauses regarding 
its compulsory procedures. Article ???, concerning ?Optional Exceptions to 
Applicability of Section ??,?? ? a lengthy and complicated single clause in 
Part XV, ?Settlement of Disputes? ? is one of the most relevant. The first 
paragraph of Article ??? allows a state to refuse to ?[accept] any one or more 
of the procedures provided for in Section ? with respect to one or more of 
the following categories of disputes?. These procedures include the following: 
?a? disputes regarding sea boundary delimitations, especially those involving 
historic bays or titles; ?b? disputes concerning military or law enforcement 
activities; and ?c? disputes in which the Security Council of the United 
Nations is exercising any function under its Charter. 
 China, therefore, considers these disputes to fall within the exceptions 
mentioned in Part XV of UNCLOS. For those disputes in category 
?a? mentioned above, there are two more ?accumulative? conditions 
explicitly mentioned in Article ??? ??a?i?. First, any dispute shall be 
excluded from arbitration if the declarant state shall ?accept submission of the 
matter to conciliation under Annex V, Section ? ??Compulsory Submission 
to Conciliation Procedure Pursuant to Section ? of Part XV???. Second, ?any 
dispute that necessarily involves the concurrent consideration of any unsettled 
dispute concerning sovereignty or other rights over continental or insular land 
territory shall be excluded from such submission? emphases added?. This 
latter condition more severely restricts any dispute submitted in this category, 
and could considerably reduce, or even bar, the possibility of submitting 
any dispute of this kind. Until the Philippines unilaterally submitted the 
South China Sea dispute, very few, if any, thought that a dispute concerning 
sovereignty or rights over continental or insular land territory would not be 
dealt with under the compulsory dispute settlement procedure of UNCLOS. 
China declared that this was so because it never doubted this interpretation of 
the clause under Article ???.
 Regarding the dispute in category ?a?, however, two other relevant 
factors need to be considered. First, Article ??? ?? implies that the declarant 
state is supposed to specify, in such a declaration, the procedure to which the 
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other state may submit. As can be seen above, China?s declaration is so simple 
that there is no reference to any available procedures in case of a dispute. It 
is not easy, however, to decide whether China?s failure in its declaration to 
designate any available procedure may have had a negative impact on China?s 
position in this case. China?s declaration could be regarded as the total 
exclusion of any dispute that may fall in the categories indicated by China 
from the compulsory dispute settlement mechanism under UNCLOS. This 
kind of practice would tend to lead this settlement mechanism to the will of 
states parties rather than to the rule of law.
 Second, and more importantly, the Tribunal ascertained the applicability 
of Article ??? ?? to this case ?Award on Jurisdiction, paragraph ????. Article 
??? ?? prescribes an established tribunal?s compétence de la compétence? as 
follows:
  In the event of a dispute as to whether a court or tribunal has jurisdiction, 
the matter shall be settled by decision of that court or tribunal.
This clause seemingly signifies that the established tribunal will, in the long 
run, have the power to decide whether it has jurisdiction over the case in 
question. In other words, UNCLOS? compulsory dispute settlement procedure 
seems to presuppose that, regardless of the declaration made under Article 
???, it is not the declarant state that will eventually decide the question of 
jurisdiction, but a court or established tribunal. One commentator is of the 
opinion that ?[t]hese exceptions are not self-judging and cannot serve as a 
simple bar to proceedings under Section ?? of Part XV ?Klein, ????. In other 
words, once a tribunal is decided to be established under these provisions of 
UNCLOS, the composition of the tribunal may be more relevant to the future 
of the litigation.
 Finding China?s declaration of ?? August ???? is an example of 
a declaration intended to activate certain exceptions to the compulsory 
settlement of disputes set out in Article ????, the Tribunal found that, under 
Article ??? ?on the prohibition of reservation and exceptions?,?? the states 
that are parties to UNCLOS are ?not free to pick and choose the portions of 
[UNCLOS] they wish to accept or reject? Award on Jurisdiction, paragraph 
??? emphases added??. Therefore, China?s declaration was identified as the 
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reservation or the exception that is prohibited under Article ???. Moreover, 
the Tribunal stressed the application of Article ??? ?? and ??? on ?Choice 
of Procedure?, which read:
 Article ???
 Choice of procedure
 ?.  When signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention or at any 
time thereafter, a State shall be free to choose, by means of a written 
declaration, one or more of the following means for the settlement of 
disputes concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention:
?a? the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea established in 
accordance with Annex VI;
?b? the International Court of Justice;
?c? an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VII;
?d? a special arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex 
VIII for one or more of the categories of disputes specified 
therein.
?...?
 ?.  A State Party, which is a party to a dispute not covered by a declaration 
in force, shall be deemed to have accepted arbitration in accordance 
with Annex VII.
The Tribunal judged that both the Philippines and China were, under Article 
??? ??, deemed to have accepted arbitration in accordance with Annex VII 
to the Convention?, because neither of them had made ?a written declaration 
choosing one of the particular means of dispute settlement set out? in Article 
??? ??. This is why the Tribunal found that the present dispute was ?correctly? 
submitted to arbitration before a tribunal constituted under Annex VII? of 
UNCLOS ?Award on Jurisdiction, paragraph ????. What does this ruling 
mean? A declaration made under Article ??? ?? is not treated as a reservation 
or exception prohibited under Article ???. 
 Finally, it may be said that the following statement of the Tribunal in 
its Award on Jurisdiction, the reasoning of which may for some ?reflect a fair 
and evenhanded process? Noyes, ????, is the most succinctly summarised 
standpoint of this Arbitration:
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  In this award, the Tribunal only addresses matters of jurisdiction and 
admissibility; it does not address the merits of the Philippines? claims. 
If the Tribunal finds it has no jurisdiction, the matter ends here. If the 
Tribunal finds it has jurisdiction over any of the Philippines? claims, it 
will hold a subsequent hearing on the merits of those claims. If it f inds 
that any of the jurisdictional issues are so closely intertwined with the merits 
that they cannot be decided as ?preliminary questions?, the Tribunal will defer 
those jurisdictional issues for decision after hearing from the Parties on the 
merits. ?Award on Jurisdiction, paragraph ?? emphases added??
Thus, the Tribunal postponed its decision on jurisdiction to the merits 
phase with respect to the majority ?eight out of fifteen? of the Philippines? 
Submissions only because, in accordance with Article ?? ?? of the Rules 
of Procedure,?? the Tribunal found that the following claims might ?[have 
depended] upon certain aspects of the merits of the Philippines? claims? 
?Award on Jurisdiction, paragraphs ???????; Award on Merits, paragraph 
???? and that they ?would be deferred for further consideration in conjunction 
with the merits? Award on Merits, paragraph ????: ??? China?s claim to 
historic rights in the South China Sea; ??? the status of certain maritime 
features therein; ??? the maritime zone in which alleged Chinese law 
enforcement activities in fact took place; and ??? the nature of certain Chinese 
activities. Moreover, the Tribunal concluded, as the rest of the Philippines? 
claims were ?not exclusively preliminary? in character, its consideration of the 
claims was reserved for the merits phase. 
 However, this logic may imply that the declaration system under Article 
??? will not actually exclude some dispute categories from the compulsory 
settlement procedure described in Part XV. It seems that this interpretation by the 
Tribunal, along with UNCLOS? operation is incompatible with states? previous 
understanding of UNCLOS: upon their ratification of, or accession to UNCLOS, 
states would be able to exclude the three categories of disputes mentioned above.
 Therefore, the South China Sea Arbitration may have established the 
notorious precedent of a state party – the Philippines – attempting a unilateral 
application. Now, it may be said that, if this precedent becomes frequently 
used in the same manner, any court or established tribunal will be much more 
likely to accept many more future cases under UNCLOS.
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B. Within the Litigation
 Regarding the historic title mentioned in category ?a? mentioned 
above, the Tribunal found that, as the meaning of ?historic title? in the law of 
the sea refers to claims of historic sovereignty over bays and other near-shore 
waters, China?s claim ?expressed in the ?Position Paper? entails not a historic 
title to the waters of the South China Sea, but historic rights to resources 
within the ?nine-dash line?. Thus, the Tribunal did not regard the exception 
of ?historic title? made by China?s declaration as a bar to its jurisdiction. 
Owing to its narrow interpretation of the concept of ?historic title?, the 
Tribunal did not associate the term with the claim of a specific maritime area 
and the geographical features therein, thus setting a dashed line through the 
South China Sea. China?s historic title? was confined to its historic claims 
to resources, such as fish stocks, within the nine-dash line, and the historical 
significance of the nine-dash line was not considered to mean ?historic title? 
under the law of the sea ?i.e. a law that includes UNCLOS?.
 Moreover, after reviewing available evidence, the Tribunal denied any 
reefs or islands claimed by China were entitled to an exclusive economic zone 
?EEZ?. This denial of an EEZ, one that would possibly overlap with both 
the Philippines and China?s EEZ, also rejected China?s defence, using an 
exception to disputes concerning sea boundary delimitation. In the merits 
phase, the Tribunal found none of the geographical features within the South 
China Sea to have the legal status of islands, as defined by Article ??? of 
UNCLOS. Furthermore, since China has no EEZ in the maritime area 
concerned, the Tribunal also denied the dispute exception in category ?b? law 
enforcement activities?. This exception due to military activities was partially 
accepted, but also partially rejected; in coming to a conclusion, the Tribunal 
relied on the statement made repeatedly by the Chinese government regarding 
the non-military nature of its land reclamation and the construction of 
artificial islands at the seven features in the Spratly Islands.
 In sum, the Tribunal found no obstacle to establishing its own 
jurisdiction, despite the exceptions that China had declared under Article ???. 
In this connection, the precedence set by the International Court of Justice 
?ICJ? is noteworthy ?Thirlway?. The Tribunal?s compétence de la compétence 
easily accepted and admitted the unilateral application of the Philippines, 
which had been carefully and tactically crafted for some strategic purposes in 
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this litigation. It is almost impossible to know whether this decision is because 
of China?s non-appearance at the arbitration, but it may be that this may 
imply that China had been disadvantaged, if not punished, under the warning 
clause with respect to default of appearance under Article ? of Annex VII 
of UNCLOS.?? The default of appearance, though not avoidable or unusual, 
may cast doubt on the authenticity and legitimacy of the Tribunal and its 
award, as any fact-finding, in particular, would have been partially one-sided 
and, unfortunately, it would become substantially impossible to uncover the 
whole picture of the dispute. For those who support the idea that the arbitral 
or judicial settlement of a dispute under the UNCLOS procedures should be 
conducted in accordance with a literal interpretation of the relevant clauses of 
UNCLOS, the award would have been acceptable. 
Ⅲ． The Two Major Controversial Points on the Merits Phase
 As mentioned above, this chapter focuses primarily on two major and 
controversial points of the ???? arbitral award: ??? China?s nine-dash line 
and ??? the geographical features in the maritime area in question.
A. China’s Nine-Dash Line
 The main theme of the litigation is the legality of the nine-dash line 
under UNCLOS. There are many interpretations for its meaning ?Ikeshima 
????, Valencia/Van Dyke/Ludwig, Yabuki, Zou?. The Arbitral Tribunal, 
however, denied, under UNCLOS, China?s claim to historic rights to resources 
within its nine-dash line on the following grounds. First, the Tribunal found 
that China?s claim to historic rights to resources is incompatible with the 
detailed allocation of rights and maritime zones in UNCLOS. Second, 
China?s rights, ?to the extent it had in the waters of the South China Sea?, 
were ?extinguished? by UNCLOS? entry into force, to the extent they were 
incompatible with the maritime zone system of UNCLOS. Third, even if 
there exists evidence that supports the use of ?islands? in the South China 
Sea by Chinese navigators and fishermen, the waters of the South China Sea 
beyond the territorial sea were, prior to UNCLOS, part of the high seas. Thus, 
the Tribunal found that China?s historical navigation and fishing represented 
the exercise of high seas freedoms, rather than a historic right, and that there 
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is no evidence that China had exclusively controlled the waters.
 It may be only natural that the Tribunal?s rejection of the legal basis 
for China?s nine-dash line derives not only from China?s failure to produce 
effective evidence ?attributable to its absence from the procedure? but also 
from the limits of the current international legal system, including UNCLOS, 
which has been largely created under the strong influence of Western 
countries, and which reflects their understanding of historical events that 
took place in the Eastern world, especially prior to the Second World War. 
Owing to its non-retrospective nature of application under the law of treaties, 
UNCLOS, among others, cannot mediate events that occurred before the 
Second World War, when colonial powers ruled international society largely 
by force and prioritised their own national interests through law-making 
processes. It may be construed that, for China, the Arbitral Tribunal, which 
was established under a Western worldview that has mainly held the same 
ideas about territorial sovereignty and maritime areas since the ???? Peace 
of Westphalia, would never have taken pains to profoundly consider the 
historical background of the South China Sea dispute as a whole ?Coleman & 
Maogoto?. However, China?s perspective will not be easily accepted under the 
dispute settlement mechanism in the current legal system of the international 
society, including UNCLOS. With respect to the settlement of the South 
China Sea dispute, particularly, a question arises as to the question how to fill 
the gap between the West and the East in terms of the settlement of territorial 
and maritime dispute of this kind.
 As the author has already considered the fundamental themes of China?s 
standpoint regarding the South China Sea dispute elsewhere ?Ikeshima, ????, 
????a, ????b, ?????, its examination here is brief and intended only as an 
update. In essence, China would not endure the historically narrow-minded 
view of the other states concerned and of the Tribunal, both in regards to 
the dispute and to the maritime areas in the South China Sea. A Chinese 
official made a statement a few years ago, saying that as UNCLOS is not 
applicable to matters occurring before its validation, the nine-dash line ?defines 
China?s territorial sovereignty and its related maritime interest?, which cannot 
be grasped by any rule of the current body of international law. It may be 
maintained that China is not a nation state, but a ?civilization state? with a 
history of over ?,??? years ?Jacques?. On the basis of this understanding, the 
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statehood of China may not easily fit the definition of a sovereign state under 
the Westphalian system ?Jacques; Coleman & Maogoto?. For more than a 
hundred years, China suffered from the aggression and semi-colonisation of 
the nineteenth century imperialism, but it rose up from this disgrace through 
victory in the Second World War and the Chinese Revolution of ????, and 
became a communist country ?Kissinger?. Naturally, however, the current 
body of international law such as UNCLOS is a very limited reflection of the 
historical aspects that China and some other states of similar ideas tend to 
support, because the rules under that body are intended to become universally 
and objectively applicable in the world.
 Therefore, because of its fundamental communist principles and its 
historical perspective, China maintains a very singular understanding of 
international law, which tends to result in conflicts with other states over the 
interpretation and application of some of its rules. Because it cherishes and 
firmly protects its land and maritime territory as the supreme composition of 
a sovereign state, it will not, in principle, entrust a third party, including an 
international court or tribunal, with the fate of any portion of its land territory. 
In other words, China will settle a territorial dispute through negotiation only 
with the state party concerned. No other country, let alone an international 
tribunal, will be able to force China under its jurisdiction in order to decide 
any part of China?s territory. It is not surprising that no Western state can 
easily understand this position, nor do any share it ?Tzou?.
 China?s mistake, therefore, might have been to become party to 
UNCLOS in ????. As mentioned above, the Tribunal concluded that China?s 
possible historic rights to resources in the South China Sea were ?extinguished? 
by the entry into force of UNCLOS. As a writer points out, China could 
still denounce UNCLOS ?Talmon?. This kind of reasoning concerning 
the Tribunal means that once China had ratified UNCLOS in ????, it was 
necessarily bound by the rules of UNCLOS. China, in this case, lost all previous 
historical interests under UNCLOS. This would mean that there is no ?Eastern? 
element in the historic title under the current body of international law, which 
is, from the Chinese point of view, the product of the Western civilisation, 
although China does not expressly maintains this in its official statement. This 
viewpoint is among those aspects that China and some developing countries 
have been severely criticising with respect to some rules of the current body of 
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international law. In other words, the more powerful China grows, the more 
frustrated it becomes under the current situation of international law. However, 
what has actually happened with China with respect to the arbitral procedures 
and the dispute is that it cannot bear with the settlement in a narrow context 
of law but so far fruitlessly challenge the status quo.
B.  The Legal Status of the Geographical Features in the Maritime 
Area in Question
 The second most striking result of the arbitral award is that the Tribunal 
did not consider any of the geographical features in question in the South 
China Sea in this dispute to be ?islands?, but instead determined that they 
were ?rocks?, in the sense of UNCLOS? regime of islands. It may be said that 
this was the ?most difficult issue? facing the Tribunal ?Beckman, ??. At the 
same time, this interpretation and application of Article ??? of UNCLOS 
had probably never been so thoroughly considered by an international court 
or tribunal in a concrete case. Since none of the features is an island in the 
meaning of Article ???, they are not entitled to an EEZ or a continental shelf 
of their own. Accordingly, there is no overlapping maritime area between the 
Philippines and China, and there was therefore no need for the Tribunal to 
dwell on the legality of China?s activities, official or military, in the maritime 
area in question. 
 In China?s opinion, the issues raised by the Philippines in its application 
were, directly or indirectly, matters that, by nature, are concurrently the 
question of territorial and maritime sovereignty, which is beyond the scope of 
the Tribunal?s jurisdiction under UNCLOS. Instead, the Tribunal went so far 
as to find that even the largest ?natural? island in the South China Sea, Taiping 
Island ?Itu Aba?, which is occupied by Taiwan,?? does not have an island?s 
legal status, but is instead only a ?rock? on the ground that it is ?not capable of 
sustaining an economic life of [its] own? Award on Merits, paragraphs ??? 
and ????. 
 Considering principally both archival materials and historical 
hydrographic surveys, along with the expertise of an appointed hydrographer, 
the Tribunal, under Articles ?? ?on low-tide elevations? and ??? ?on the 
regime of islands? of UNCLOS, examined and classified the features in 
question on the basis of their natural condition. Article ?? reads:
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 Article ??
 Low-tide elevations
 ?.  A low-tide elevation is a naturally formed area of land which is 
surrounded by and above water at low tide but submerged at high 
tide. Where a low-tide elevation is situated wholly or partly at a 
distance not exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the 
mainland or an island, the low-water line on that elevation may be 
used as the baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea.
 ?.  Where a low-tide elevation is wholly situated at a distance exceeding 
the breadth of the territorial sea from the mainland or an island, it has 
no territorial sea of its own.
The essential points of this provision in the Award are: ??? the ?naturally 
formed? nature of the low-tide elevation in question, and ??? its submergence 
during high tide. Considering the evidence available to it, the Tribunal 
admitted none of the features to have the status of an island, but did designate 
some as high-tide features and others as submerged during high tide.
 Article ???, which is most relevant here, reads as follows:
 Article ???
 Regime of islands
 ?.  An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, 
which is above water at high tide. 
 ?.  Except as provided for in paragraph ?, the territorial sea, the 
contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental 
shelf of an island are determined in accordance with the provisions of 
this Convention applicable to other land territory. 
 ?.  Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of 
their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.
 This was essentially the first time an international tribunal interpreted 
and applied to a concrete case the criteria mentioned in Article ??? ?? of 
UNCLOS ?Award on Merits, paragraph ????.?? Even though this provision 
is ?poorly drafted? Churchill & Lowe, ??? or is a provision of ?deliberately 
negotiated vagueness? McDorman?, the Tribunal noted that this provision 
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was related to the so-called creeping jurisdiction of coastal states. Judging 
from the object and purpose of Article ??? ??, the Tribunal found that the 
provision was intended to prevent ?encroachment? on the deep seabed ?or 
the common heritage of mankind? or to prevent features from generating 
large entitlements to maritime zones that would otherwise infringe on the 
entitlements of inhabited territory or on the high seas and the Area ?the deep 
seabed? ?Award on Merits, paragraph ????. The Tribunal concluded that 
entitlements depend on the following: ?a? the objective capacity of a feature, 
?b? in its natural conditions, to sustain either ?c? a stable community of 
people or ?d? economic activity that is neither dependent on outside resources 
nor purely extractive in nature. As shown in the ICJ judgment of ???? in 
Territorial and Maritime Dispute ?Nicaragua v. Colombia?, the award on merits 
pronounced that the ?size cannot be dispositive of a feature?s status as a fully 
entitled island or rock and is not, on its own, a relevant factor? Award on 
Merits, paragraph ????.
 As the current features in the maritime areas in question, owing to land 
reclamation and other related human activities, do not have the capacity to 
sustain a stable community of people, they are not deemed to be inhabitable 
islands. The Tribunal was of the opinion that temporary use of the features 
by fishermen did not amount to habitation of a stable community, and that 
all historical economic activity on these areas had been extractive in nature. 
Accordingly, it concluded that all of the high-tide features in the Spratly 
Islands, which were at issue in the arbitration, are legally ?rocks? that do not 
generate an EEZ or continental shelf. Thus, the Tribunal could not help 
but decide that none of the geographical features in the South China Sea 
are islands but rocks, as the hired expert reported that habitation and an 
independent economic life could not be established.
 Therefore, it seems that, from the beginning, the Tribunal may have had 
the following order of the whole structure of the award: ??? there is no island 
but rocks and reefs in the maritime area in question; ??? these geographical 
features have no entitlement to an EEZ; ??? there is no overlap of EEZ of 
the states concerned in this maritime area; and, accordingly; and ??? there is 
no bar of territorial sovereignty or maritime delimitation in this arbitration. 
Because the largest geographical feature even in the South China Sea, such as 
Taiping Island, was denied its legal status as an island, no state in the region 
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would feel pleased to accept the reasoning of the Tribunal.
 Finally, it should be added that the arbitral award might have an 
unexpected backlash particularly on Japan?s position concerning the legal 
status of Okinotorishima as an island. Japan argues that Okinotorishima may 
be entitled to an EEZ of ??? nautical miles, while China and South Korea 
have been arguing against this position and identifying it as a rock ?Ikeshima, 
?????. Although Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga 
maintained the country?s official view a few days after the arbitral award ?Mie?, 
this position of the Japanese government may become considerably harder 
to defend in international society in the face of this award. The Japanese 
standpoint must be examined in light of the Tribunal?s pronouncement 
concerning the two major elements of an island?s legal status under Article 
??? of UNCLOS: ??? it is a naturally formed feature that is not submerged at 
high tide, and ??? it is able to sustain an economic life of its own.
 It is widely believed that, irrespective of its name, Okinotorishima in fact 
meets neither of these two conditions. Though there is no international dispute 
over the territorial sovereignty of Okinotorishima, China, in particular, has 
criticised Japan?s attempts to protect the landmass from wave erosion and to reclaim 
the features of Okinotori ?rock? with concrete and titanium as a way of disguising 
its real status and the fact that it does not meet the requirements of Article ???. 
As the award in the South China Sea dispute seems to emphasise the second 
factor ? human habitation and economic life ?China?s criticism of Japan?s position 
regarding Okinotorishima ironically turned out to end up hurting their own case.
Ⅳ．Conclusion
 From the beginning of the litigation, unilaterally initiated by the 
Philippines, it was almost obvious that China?s position would not easily 
gain judicial or arbitral support; the fundamental idea of the nine-dash line 
and China?s territoriality of the South China Sea is far beyond the scope of 
existing international law, including UNCLOS. As is indicated in the last part 
of the Arbitral Award, the root of the dispute lies in ?fundamentally different 
understandings of their respective rights under the Convention in the waters 
of the South China Sea? Award on Merits, paragraph ?????. On the basis of 
consensualism regarding a matter of sovereignty, China has never wanted any 
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third party, such as an international tribunal, to decide the legal meaning of 
the nine-dash line or to mediate the territorial dispute over the South China 
Sea, as the territory, its maritime area and its resources in the area consist of 
China?s core interests?. At the same time, China has long been aware that 
the current world legal order does not work in favour of China?s legal and 
historical position and that, therefore, no legal rule is neatly applicable to 
the dispute over the nine-dash line and China?s territorial sovereignty in the 
South China Sea. All China could do was to deny the Arbitral Tribunal?s 
jurisdiction from the beginning. It is no wonder, however, that this position 
was not accepted by the Tribunal, as discussed above.
 In this sense, the Arbitral Award of ?? July ???? has reinforced 
the Western world?s persistent criticism towards China?s assertive and 
sometimes aggressive policies and activities in the South China Sea and other 
neighbouring maritime areas. From the Chinese point of view, it may be said 
that the Award has been welcomed mainly by the Western world, whose 
perspective in the region in question has been largely based on the Peace of 
San Francisco and its legacies ?Hara?. Regardless of its intention, China, who 
is not a party to the ???? Peace Treaty of San Francisco, is not, in principle, 
bound by the Treaty but has been inevitably under the strong influence of the 
so-called San Francisco system in the regions of East and South Asia. 
 In this connection, it is understandable that the G? countries are in one 
voice to issue the following statement adopted by the G? Foreign Ministers? 
Meeting in New York on ?? September ????:
  [T]he foreign ministers remained concerned about the situation in the 
East China Sea and South China Sea, and along with reconfirming the 
G??s position of emphasizing the rule of law, they shared the view that 
the G? will continue to present a united voice aimed at achieving the 
rule of law. The foreign ministers shared recognition that the award in 
the arbitration between the Republic of the Philippines and the People?s 
Republic of China provides a useful basis for further efforts to peacefully 
resolve disputes in the South China Sea.??
The G? countries, who provided this critical statement, stress the rule of law, 
towards the situation in the South China Sea as well as the East China Sea.
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 In terms of the territorial dispute settlement in the region, however, 
the present author is of the opinion that this kind of repetitive and obstinate 
check of the world?s political scenes and diplomatic forays will not necessarily 
be as effective in the long run as it might seem. In fact, the latest situation of 
the South China Sea as of the end of the year ???? seems to be particularly 
unstable owing to a series of unpredicted relevant events regarding the region 
such as the recent tacit deal between China?s President Xi Jinping and the 
Philippines? President Rodrigo Duterte and the new approach to China 
introduced by the President-elect Donald Trump. These events may have 
put the Award aside for the time being, reducing the real value of the arbitral 
settlement in the face of international political realities. What seems to be 
more important here for every state concerned in the disputed region is, as the 
author maintained elsewhere, to realise the following:
  [T]he solution to the dispute over the South China Sea is not confined 
to the arguments regarding a judgment on the legal meaning of the 
dashed line that is issued within the framework of international law, but 
also entails a plan for maintaining peace and stability in the maritime 
area by eradicating the fundamental confrontational factors including 
the territorial dispute through peaceful means and cooperation among 
all the states concerned. ?Ikeshima, ????, ?????
In the disputes over territorial sovereignty such as the South China Sea 
dispute, China does not necessarily play the game of Western international 
law ?Jacques?. It is certain that China?s unilateral and arbitrary attitude 
towards fundamental values such as the rule of law will be widely criticised 
and negated in international society. It goes without saying that, without 
?denouncing UNCLOS? Talmon?, China also needs to responsibly try its 
best to think and act beyond its domestic principles and policies, so that the 
region will maintain peace and stability. However, like other major powers, 
who tend to ignore unfavourable rulings in a case at an international court 
or tribunal, China does not feel obliged to be bound by it, as China has 
already become powerful enough to overcome any difficulties in pursuing its 
own foreign policy in accordance with its communist principles. Therefore, 
a resolution under the compulsory dispute settlement mechanism under the 
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current rules of international law is inevitably partial and unreasonable as the 
final goal of regional peace and political independence in Southeast Asia, 
where China?s dominant influence on other neighbouring states in terms of 
history, geography, and economy, in particular, cannot and will not be easily 
erased.
 In order for both the Philippines and China to ease the recent tensions 
in the region, the following suggestions are worth immediate consideration: 
??? let both sides resume a peaceful dialogue on the normalisation of the 
current regional tension, in accordance with the DOC; ??? negotiate an 
agreement to leave aside, for the time being, the territorial sovereignty issue 
of the geographical features in the South China Sea; ??? as soon as possible, 
make a fisheries agreement in order to regulate fishermen?s activities in the 
relevant maritime areas ?Valencia?; and, finally, ??? establish a hotline or 
similar mechanism between the two countries so that they can safely avoid 
an inadvertent clash in case of a maritime emergency. It is also in the regional 
interest to let the countries concerned in the region settle the dispute by 
themselves within a regional framework, such as the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations ?ASEAN?, and to let the parties concerned resume bilateral 
talks without any further interruption by a third party.
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? Article ? e? of Annex VII of UNCLOS reads:
  Article ?
  Constitution of arbitral tribunal
   For the purpose of proceedings under this Annex, the arbitral tribunal shall, unless 
the parties otherwise agree, be constituted as follows:
  ?...?
?e? Unless the parties agree that any appointment under subparagraphs ?c? and 
?d? be made by a person or a third State chosen by the parties, the President 
of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea shall make the necessary 
appointments. If the President is unable to act under this subparagraph or is a 
national of one of the parties to the dispute, the appointment shall be made by 
the next senior member of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
who is available and is not a national of one of the parties. The appointments 
referred to in this subparagraph shall be made from the list referred to in article 
? of this Annex within a period of ?? days of the receipt of the request and in 
consultation with the parties. The members so appointed shall be of different 
nationalities and may not be in the service of, ordinarily resident in the territory 
of, or nationals of, any of the parties to the dispute.
? For the arbitral award on jurisdiction of ?? October ????, see the official website of 
the PCA at <https://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/????> ?accessed ?? October 
?????.
? For China?s Position Paper? of ? December ????, see the official website of the Chinese 
Foreign Ministry at <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_??????/t???????.shtml> 
?accessed ? December ?????.
? China?s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ?China Adheres to the Position of Settling 
Through Negotiation the Relevant Disputes Between China and the Philippines in 
the south China Sea?, at its website <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_??????/
t???????.shtml> ?accessed ?? July ?????.
? Article ??? of UNCLOS reads:
  Article ???
  Procedure where no settlement has been reached by the parties
  ?.  If the States Parties which are parties to a dispute concerning the interpretation or 
application of this Convention have agreed to seek settlement of the dispute by a 
peaceful means of their own choice, the procedures provided for in this Part apply 
only where no settlement has been reached by recourse to such means and the 
agreement between the parties does not exclude any further procedure.
  ?.  If the parties have also agreed on a time-limit, paragraph ? applies only upon the 
expiration of that time-limit.
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? Article ??? of UNCLOS reads:
  Article ???
  Obligations under general, regional or bilateral agreements
   If the States Parties which are parties to a dispute concerning the interpretation or 
application of this Convention have agreed, through a general, regional or bilateral 
agreement or otherwise, that such dispute shall, at the request of any party to the 
dispute, be submitted to a procedure that entails a binding decision, that procedure 
shall apply in lieu of the procedures provided for in this Part, unless the parties to 
the dispute otherwise agree.
? Article ??? of UNCLOS reads:
  Article ???
  Obligation to exchange views
  ?.  When a dispute arises between States Parties concerning the interpretation 
or application of this Convention, the parties to the dispute shall proceed 
expeditiously to an exchange of views regarding its settlement by negotiation or 
other peaceful means.
  ?.  The parties shall also proceed expeditiously to an exchange of views where a 
procedure for the settlement of such a dispute has been terminated without a 
settlement or where a settlement has been reached and the circumstances require 
consultation regarding the manner of implementing the settlement.
?? For China?s declaration, see the following website of the United Nations: <http://www.
un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm#China after 
ratification> ?accessed ?? September ?????.
?? See the Arbitral award on jurisdiction and admissibility, note ?.
?? Article ??? of UNCLOS reads:
  Article ???
  Optional exceptions to applicability of section ?
  ?.  When signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention or at any time thereafter, 
a State may, without prejudice to the obligations arising under section ?, declare in 
writing that it does not accept any one or more of the procedures provided for in 
section ? with respect to one or more of the following categories of disputes:
  ? ?a? i? disputes concerning the interpretation or application of articles ??, ?? and 
?? relating to sea boundary delimitations, or those involving historic bays 
or titles, provided that a State having made such a declaration shall, when 
such a dispute arises subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention 
and where no agreement within a reasonable period of time is reached in 
negotiations between the parties, at the request of any party to the dispute, 
accept submission of the matter to conciliation under Annex V, section 
?; and provided further that any dispute that necessarily involves the 
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concurrent consideration of any unsettled dispute concerning sovereignty 
or other rights over continental or insular land territory shall be excluded 
from such submission;
  ??  ?ii? after the conciliation commission has presented its report, which shall state 
the reasons on which it is based, the parties shall negotiate an agreement on 
the basis of that report; if these negotiations do not result in an agreement, 
the parties shall, by mutual consent, submit the question to one of the 
procedures provided for in section ?, unless the parties otherwise agree; 
  ?? ?iii? this subparagraph does not apply to any sea boundary dispute finally 
settled by an arrangement between the parties, or to any such dispute 
which is to be settled in accordance with a bilateral or multilateral 
agreement binding upon those parties;
  ??b? disputes concerning military activities, including military activities by 
government vessels and aircraft engaged in non-commercial service, and 
disputes concerning law enforcement activities in regard to the exercise of 
sovereign rights or jurisdiction excluded from the jurisdiction of a court or 
tribunal under article ???, paragraph ? or ?;
  ??c? disputes in respect of which the Security Council of the United Nations is 
exercising the functions assigned to it by the Charter of the United Nations, 
unless the Security Council decides to remove the matter from its agenda or 
calls upon the parties to settle it by the means provided for in this Convention.
  ?.  A State Party which has made a declaration under paragraph ? may at any time 
withdraw it, or agree to submit a dispute excluded by such declaration to any 
procedure specified in this Convention.
  ?.  A State Party which has made a declaration under paragraph ? shall not be entitled to 
submit any dispute falling within the excepted category of disputes to any procedure 
in this Convention as against another State Party, without the consent of that party.
  ?.  If one of the States Parties has made a declaration under paragraph ? a?, any 
other State Party may submit any dispute falling within an excepted category 
against the declarant party to the procedure specified in such declaration.
  ?.  A new declaration, or the withdrawal of a declaration, does not in any way affect 
proceedings pending before a court or tribunal in accordance with this article, 
unless the parties otherwise agree.
  ?.  Declarations and notices of withdrawal of declarations under this article shall be 
deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall transmit 
copies thereof to the States Parties.
?? Article ??? reads:
  Article ???
  Reservations and exceptions
   No reservations or exceptions may be made to this Convention unless expressly 
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permitted by other articles of this Convention.
?? Article ?? ?? of the Rules of Procedure of the Arbitration calls for the Tribunal to rule 
on any plea concerning its jurisdiction as a preliminary question, ?unless the Arbitral 
Tribunal determines, after seeking the views of the Parties, that the objection to its 
jurisdiction does not possess an exclusively preliminary character, in which case it shall 
rule on such a plea in conjunction with the merits.? emphases added?
?? Article ? of Annex VII of UNCLOS reads:
  Article ?
  Default of appearance
   If one of the parties to the dispute does not appear before the arbitral tribunal or 
fails to defend its case, the other party may request the tribunal to continue the 
proceedings and to make its award. Absence of a party or failure of a party to defend 
its case shall not constitute a bar to the proceedings. Before making its award, the 
arbitral tribunal must satisfy itself not only that it has jurisdiction over the dispute 
but also that the claim is well founded in fact and law.
?? See Taiwan?s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ?ROC [Taiwan?s] Position on the South 
China Sea Arbitration?, at its official website at <http://www.mofa.gov.tw/en/News_
Content.aspx?n=?EADDCFD?C?EC???&s=?B?A???????EB???> ?accessed ?? 
July ?????. In this position paper, Taiwan states the following: ??? the Award has no 
legally binding force on Taiwan because the Award?s reference to Taiwan as ?Taiwan 
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?? One may find another occasion in the judgment of the International Court of Justice 
?ICJ? in the case of Territorial and Maritime Dispute ?Nicaragua v. Colombia?, Merits 
Judgment, ICJ Reports ???? .
?? See ?G? Foreign Minister? Meeting?, at the following website of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Japan: < http://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/pc/page?e_??????.html> ?accessed ?? 
September ?????.
?? This passage has been supported in the concluding part of the following: Shigeki 
Sakamoto, ?Historic Waters and Rights Revisited: UNCLOS and Beyond??, The Rule 
of Law in the Seas of Asia: Navigational Chart for Peace and Stability, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs for Japan, ????, pp. ??-??, at ??-??. For the original slides of Professor 
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